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Abstract. Even though a method to perfectly sign quantum messages has not been
known, the arbitrated quantum signature scheme has been considered as one of good
candidates. However, its forgery problem has been an obstacle to the scheme being a
successful method. In this paper, we consider one situation, which is slightly different
from the forgery problem, that we check whether at least one quantum message with
signature can be forged in a given scheme, although all the messages cannot be forged.
If there exist only a finite number of forgeable quantum messages in the scheme then
the scheme can be secure against the forgery attack by not sending the forgeable
quantum messages, and so our situation does not directly imply that we check whether
the scheme is secure against the attack. But, if users run a given scheme without
any consideration of forgeable quantum messages then a sender might transmit such
forgeable messages to a receiver, and an attacker can forge the messages if the attacker
knows them in such a case. Thus it is important and necessary to look into forgeable
quantum messages. We here show that there always exists such a forgeable quantum
message-signature pair for every known scheme with quantum encryption and rotation,
and numerically show that any forgeable quantum message-signature pairs do not exist
in an arbitrated quantum signature scheme.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
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21. Introduction
Digital signature has been considered as one of the most important cryptographic
tools for not only authentication of digital messages and data integrity but also non-
repudiation of origin. Thus, since the advent of quantum cryptography which provides
us with unconditional security in key distribution, many studies on quantum-mechanics-
based signatures have been conducted.
In particular, it was pointed out that digitally signing quantum messages is
not possible [1] although quantum mechanics can be helpful in digital signature [2].
Hence, quantumly signing quantum messages with the help of an arbitrator has been
suggested [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], and the signature schemes are called the
arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) schemes.
In most AQS schemes on the qubit system, their quantum signature operators
consist of two parts. One is called the random rotation {Rj}j∈Z2 defined by two Pauli
operators σx and σz, that is, R0 = σx and R1 = σz, and the other is called the quantum
encryption {Ek}k∈Z4 [14] such that for all qubit states ρ
1
4
∑
k∈Z4
EkρE
†
k =
1
2
I, (1)
where Ek are unitary operators.
In the AQS schemes, by applying these two parts of operators to a given quantum
message |M〉 according to the previously shared key (j, k), the signature
|S〉 = EkRj|M〉 (2)
is obtained, and the validity of the signature can basically be determined as follows:
Let |M ′〉 be the transmitted message and R†jE†k|S ′〉 be the state obtained by applying
the inverse of quantum signature operators to the transmitted signature |S ′〉, then the
signature is valid if and only if
|M ′〉 ' R†jE†k|S ′〉, (3)
where A ' B means that A and B are the same up to global phase. In other words, for
each j ∈ Z2 and k ∈ Z4, there exists a real number θjk such that
|M ′〉 = eiθjkR†jE†k|S ′〉. (4)
We note that one can judge with high probability whether or not the two states |M ′〉 and
R†jE
†
k|S ′〉 are equal up to global phase, by exploiting the swap test [15] for appropriate
number of copies of the states.
We remark that all quantum encryptions are not useful for AQS schemes. In
particular, it has been shown that if quantum encryption consists of only the Pauli
operators σx, σy, σz and the identity operator I, then the AQS schemes with the
quantum encryption are not secure against a receiver’s forgery attack [7, 8, 10, 12, 13].
In order to recover the security of the AQS schemes, the following form of quantum
encryption Ek was proposed [8]: For k ∈ Z4, Ek = V σkW , where V and W are proper
unitary operators, σ0 = I, σ1 = σx, σ2 = σy and σ3 = σz. However, if the above
3encryption is employed then, as seen in Eq. (2), the unitary operator V in the signature
|S〉 = V σkWRj|M〉 can always be eliminated by an attacker’s applying the inverse
of V . Therefore, the quantum encryption proposed in Ref. [8] can be reduced to the
encryption
Ek = σkW, (5)
for k ∈ Z4. This unitary operator W is called an assistant unitary operator of the AQS
scheme [13].
Let us consider a situation that there exists a non-identity unitary operator Q such
that all the operators R†jW
†σkQσkWRj become the identical unitary operator U up to
global phase, regardless of the shared key (j, k), that is, for all j ∈ Z2 and k ∈ Z4,
R†jW
†σkQσkWRj ' U. (6)
We remark that if |S〉 = σkWRj|M〉 and the transmitted message-signature pair is
(|M〉, |S〉) then the pair can be forged as (U |M〉, Q|S〉) since the forged message U |M〉
and the forged signature Q|S〉 satisfy the validity condition (3), that is, for all j ∈ Z2
and k ∈ Z4
U |M〉 ' R†jW †σkQ|S〉. (7)
It follows that it is possible for the receiver to forge all quantum message-signature
pairs in this situation, and it can hence be shown that the scheme with the quantum
encryption and the rotation satisfying Eq. (6) is insecure against a forgery attack.
Recently, Zhang et al. [13] pointed out that if an unitary operator Q satisfies Eq. (6)
for some unitary U and W then Q must be one of the Pauli operators. Furthermore, for
each Pauli operator σl, they characterised the class of the assistant unitary operators
W satisfying the following: There exists an unitary U such that
R†jW
†σkσlσkWRj ' U (8)
for all j ∈ Z2 and k ∈ Z4. From the characterisation, one can obtain the class of the
W ’s that provide us with quantum encryptions in which all quantum message-signature
pairs cannot be forged. As an example of such a secure assistant unitary operator, Wa
was introduced in Ref. [13], where
Wa =
1√
2
(
1 eipi/4
e−ipi/4 −1
)
, (9)
and it was shown that there is no unitary U which satisfies Eq. (8).
Now, let us take into account a slightly different situation as the following: For a
given assistant unitary operator W , there exist a quantum message |M0〉, non-identity
unitary Q and unitary U such that
R†jW
†σ†kQσkWRj|M0〉 ' U |M0〉 (10)
for all j ∈ Z2 and k ∈ Z4. This implies that the receiver can forge at least one quantum
message and its signature although all other quantum message-signature pairs cannot be
forged. Here, a quantum message satisfying Eq. (10) is said to be forgeable in the AQS
4scheme with an assistant unitary operator W . For example, if the operator Wa in Eq. (9)
is given as an assistant unitary operator in the AQS scheme then the computational basis
states |c〉 become forgeable quantum messages, since
R†jW
†
aσ
†
kσ3σkWaRj|c〉 ' σ1|c〉 (11)
for all j ∈ Z2 and k ∈ Z4, where c is 0 or 1. Hence, even though there does not exist
any unitary U satisfying Eq. (8) in the AQS scheme with Wa as an assistant unitary
operator, there can exist a forgeable quantum message in the AQS scheme.
We note that, assuming that there are only a finite number of forgeable quantum
messages in a given scheme, then all other messages except the forgeable messages
have no problem to be transmitted, and thus it is possible to secure the scheme from
the forgery attack if the forgeable messages are not sent to the receiver. Therefore, the
scheme can be secure against the forgery attack, although there exist forgeable quantum
messages in the scheme. However, if we do not consider forgeable quantum messages
in a given scheme then users might use such forgeable messages in the scheme, and the
messages can be forged if the attacker knows them in this situation. Hence forgeable
quantum messages should be investigated and analysed in studying AQS schemes.
In this paper, we show that for every known AQS scheme with the random rotation
{Rj}j∈Z2 and the quantum encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 as in Eq. (5), there always exists at
least one forgeable quantum message. In this situation, one question naturally arises,
such as whether there exists an AQS scheme without any forgeable quantum message.
In this paper, we numerically show that there exists no forgeable quantum message in
an AQS scheme with proper random rotation and quantum encryption.
2. Forgeable messages in AQS schemes
For any unitary W , we note that
σ1W
†σ1Wσ1 ' σ1W †σkσ1σkWσ1,
σ3W
†σ1Wσ3 ' σ3W †σkσ1σkWσ3, (12)
for all k ∈ Z4, since σ1 commutes or anti-commutes with all Pauli matrices, that is,
σ1 ' σkσ1σk for all k ∈ Z4. Thus it follows that there exists a forgeable message |M0〉
with the forgery unitary operators Q = σ1 and U ' σ1W †σ1Wσ1 or σ3W †σ1Wσ3 in an
AQS scheme with the random rotation {Rj}j∈Z2 and a quantum encryption {σkW}k∈Z4
if there exists a message |M0〉 such that
σ1W
†σ1Wσ1|M0〉 ' σ3W †σ1Wσ3|M0〉. (13)
In particular, Eq. (13) is essentially equivalent to the statement that |M0〉 is an eigenstate
of the unitary operator
σ3W
†σ1Wσ3σ1W †σ1Wσ1 ' σ3Wσ1W †σ2W †σ1Wσ1 (14)
with eigenvalue eiθ for some real number θ.
5However, since any unitary operator is normal and its eigenvalues have all modulus
one, there always exists such an eigenstate of the unitary operator in Eq. (14) by the
spectral decomposition theorem. Similarly, it can be also shown that there exists a
forgeable quantum message with respect to the forgery unitary operators Q = σl and
U ' σ1W †σlWσ1, where l = 2, 3. This implies that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. Assume that an AQS scheme consists of the random rotation {Rj}j∈Z2
and a quantum encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 with an assistant unitary operatorW . Then there
exists at least one forgeable qubit message |M0〉, that is, there exist a qubit message |M0〉
and forgery unitary operators Q and U satisfying Eq. (10) for all j ∈ Z2 and k ∈ Z4.
We remark that Theorem 1 can be also shown by a constructive proof. In other
words, in a given AQS scheme with the random rotation {Rj}j∈Z2 and a quantum
encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 , one can find a forgeable message |M0〉 and forgery unitary
operators Q = σ1 and U . For example, for the AQS scheme with the assistant unitary
operator Wa in Eq. (9), one can construct a forgeable quantum message
|M0〉 = 1√
2
√
3−√3
((√
3− 1
)
|0〉+
√
2|1〉
)
(15)
and forgery unitary operators Q = σ1 and U ' Wa or W ∗a , and can also show that, for
all j ∈ Z2 and k ∈ Z4,
R†jW
†σkσ1σkWRj|M0〉
' 1√
2
√
3−√3
(√
2eipi/6|0〉+
(√
3− 1
)
e−5ipi/6|1〉
)
' Wa|M0〉 or W ∗a |M0〉. (16)
In general, for an AQS scheme with an arbitrary assistant unitary operator W , a
forgeable quantum message can be constructed as follows.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that an assistant unitary operator W
has the following representation [16]:
W = w0σ0 + iw1σ1 − iw2σ2 + iw3σ3, (17)
where wj ∈ R, w0 ≥ 0 and
∑
j∈Z4 w
2
j = 1. Let
α =
1
2
(
w20 + w
2
1 − w22 − w23
)
= w20 + w
2
1 −
1
2
=
1
2
− w22 − w23,
β = w0w2 + w1w3,
γ = w0w3 − w1w2. (18)
If β = 0 then it can readily be obtained that
σ1W
†σ1Wσ1|0〉 = 2 (α− iγ) |1〉
' − 2 (α + iγ) |1〉
= σ3W
†σ1Wσ3|0〉, (19)
which implies
R†jW
†σkσ1σkWRj|0〉 ' σ1W †σ1Wσ1|0〉, (20)
6for all j ∈ Z2 and k ∈ Z4, since it is clear that
σ1W
†σ1Wσ1 ' σ1W †σkσ1σkWσ1,
σ3W
†σ1Wσ3 ' σ3W †σkσ1σkWσ3, (21)
for all k ∈ Z4. Since if we take Q = σ1 and U = σ1W †σ1Wσ1 then Eq. (20) is
equivalent to the forgeability condition in Eq. (10), we can say that the qubit message
|0〉 is forgeable in AQS schemes with the random rotation {Rj}j∈Z2 and a quantum
encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 whose assistant unitary operator W satisfies β = 0.
We now assume that β 6= 0, and let |M0〉 be a qubit message defined as
|M0〉 = 1√
µ2 + 1
(µ|0〉+ |1〉) , (22)
where
µ =
α +
√
α2 + β2
β
, (23)
and let Q and U be forgery unitary operators, which are defined as Q = σ1 and
U = 2
(
−β α + iγ
α− iγ β
)
or 2
(
β −α + iγ
−α− iγ −β
)
. (24)
Then it follows that, for all j ∈ Z2 and k ∈ Z4,
R†jW
†σkσ1σkWRj|M0〉
'
√
2β(α− βµ+ γi)√
αµ+ β
|0〉+
√
2((α− γi)βµ+ β2)√
(αµ+ β)β
|1〉
' U |M0〉. (25)
Hence one can construct a forgeable quantum message in an arbitrary AQS scheme of
the form in Theorem 1.
3. AQS schemes without forgeable messages
We have shown that, for every assistant unitary operator W , there exists at least one
forgeable qubit message in the AQS scheme with the random rotation {Rj}j∈Z2 and a
quantum encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 . In this section, we numerically show that any forgeable
qubit message does not exist in an AQS scheme with a slightly modified random rotation
and a suitable assistant unitary operator.
In order to get rid of forgeable quantum messages, we first point out that the
random rotation {Rj}j∈Z2 in the known AQS schemes is biased, and the biased random
rotation may be one of reasons why there exists a forgeable quantum message. Thus we
here use an AQS scheme with an unbiased random rotation {R˜j}j∈Z4 , where R˜j = σj
for each j ∈ Z4. We note that the random rotation {R˜j}j∈Z4 is a kind of quantum
encryption since the random rotation satisfies Eq. (1), and so the above scheme can
be considered as one of AQS schemes with sequential quantum encryption, which were
presented in Ref. [12].
7Q W = w0σ0 + iw1σ1 − iw2σ2 + iw3σ3
w20 + w
2
1 − 1/2 = w0w3 − w1w2 = 0
σ1 w
2
0 + w
2
1 − 1/2 = w0w2 + w1w3 = 0
w0w3 − w1w2 = w0w2 + w1w3 = 0
w20 + w
2
2 − 1/2 = w0w1 − w2w3 = 0
σ2 w
2
0 + w
2
2 − 1/2 = w0w3 + w1w2 = 0
w0w1 − w2w3 = w0w3 + w1w2 = 0
w20 + w
2
3 − 1/2 = w0w2 − w1w3 = 0
σ3 w
2
0 + w
2
3 − 1/2 = w0w1 + w2w3 = 0
w0w2 − w1w3 = w0w1 + w2w3 = 0
Table 1. Characaterisation of assistant unitary operators W which make all qubit
messages forgeable in AQS schemes with its random rotation {R˜j}j∈Z4 and quantum
encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 when a given forgery attack Q is one of the Pauli matrices:
For each forgery attack σl, if an assistant unitary operator W satisfies one of the three
pairs of equations in wj ’s then all qubit messages become forgeable.
We now find an assistant unitary operator which we can consider as one of the most
suitable ones. In order to find it, we begin with observing one simple case, such as the
case that all quantum messages are forgeable in a given AQS scheme with its random
rotation {R˜j}j∈Z4 and quantum encryption {σkW}k∈Z4 .
In particular, Table 1 shows us what assistant unitary operators W can make all
qubit messages forgeable in the AQS scheme, when a forgery attack operator Q, which
is in Eq. (6), is one of the Pauli matrices. For example, if Q = σ1 then all qubit messages
become forgeable when the operator W satisfies two of the three equations, α = 0, β = 0
and γ = 0, since
α = w20 + w
2
1 −
1
2
,
β = w0w2 + w1w3,
γ = w0w3 − w1w2, (26)
as seen in Eqs. (18).
If an assistant unitary operator W has at most two non-zero wj’s, then such an
operator W satisfies at least one of nine pairs of equations in wj’s which appear in
Table 1, and thus all qubit messages are forgeable in the AQS scheme. Hence we note
that at least three wj’s should be non-zero, in order for all qubit messages not to be
forgeable. However, all unitary operator with at least three non-zero wj’s are not good
candidates of assistant operators for AQS schemes without forgeable quantum messages.
For examples, since
Wa ' i
2
(
σ1 − σ2 +
√
2σ3
)
, (27)
Wa has three non-zero wj’s. Nevertheless, in the AQS scheme with the assistant unitary
operator Wa in Eq. (27), the computational basis states |c〉 become forgeable quantum
8messages since for all j ∈ Z4 and k ∈ Z4,
R˜†jW
†
aσ
†
kσ3σkWaR˜j|c〉 ' |c⊕ 1〉 = σ1|c〉, (28)
where ⊕ is the addition modulo 2.
Here we take an operator T defined by
T =
i√
3
(σ1 − σ2 + σ3) (29)
as an assistant unitary operator for an AQS scheme without forgeable messages, and let
d(·, ·) be a distance between two unitary operators defined as
d(Φ,Ψ) = |φ0 − ψ0|+ |φ1 − ψ1|+ |φ2 − ψ2|+ |φ3 − ψ3|, (30)
where Φ and Ψ are unitary operators with form in Eq. (17), that is,
Φ ' φ0σ0 + iφ1σ1 − iφ2σ2 + iφ3σ3,
Ψ ' ψ0σ0 + iψ1σ1 − iψ2σ2 + iψ3σ3. (31)
Then the operator T among unitary operators of form in Eq. (17) with at least three
non-zero coefficients of σj’s is one of the farthest ones from the identity operator σ0 with
respect to the distance defined in Eq. (30), that is, for any unitary W ,
d(σ0,W ) ≤ 1 +
√
3 = d(σ0, T ). (32)
Therefore, the operator T could be considered as one good candidate of an assistant
unitary operator for an AQS scheme without forgeable messages.
From now on, we numerically investigate the forgeability of the AQS scheme with
the random rotation {R˜j}j∈Z4 and the quantum encryption {σkT}k∈Z4 . Let Q be an
arbitrary forgery attack operator defined as
Q ' q0σ0 + iq1σ1 − iq2σ2 + iq3σ3, (33)
where qj are real numbers with q0 ≥ 0 and
∑
j∈Z4 q
2
j = 1, and let dQ be its distance from
the identity operator σ0, that is,
dQ = d(σ0, Q) = |1− q0|+ |q1|+ |q2|+ |q3|. (34)
For each qubit message |M〉, let PQ,|M〉 be the probability with which a forgery attack
can be detected by using the swap test once, then it follows from Ref. [15] that
PQ,|M〉 = 1− 1
29
∑
j,k,j′,k′∈Z4
(
1 + |〈M |∆jkj′k′ |M〉|2
)
, (35)
where
∆jkj′k′ = σjT
†σkQ†σkTσjσj′T †σk′Qσk′Tσj′ . (36)
Let PQ be the minimum of PQ,|M〉 taken over all qubit messages |M〉, then the value
of PQ can efficiently be calculated for a given Q. For 100,000 randomly chosen Q, the
points (dQ, PQ) are plotted in Figure 1.
For each 0 ≤ d ≤ 1+√3, let Pmin(d) be the minimum of PQ’s taken over all unitary
operators Q with dQ = d, then Pmin(d) can be described as the greatest lower bound of
9Figure 1. The minimal probability to detect the forgery attack over all qubit
messages by exploiting the swap test once, plotted against the distance defined in
Eq. (30) from the identity operator σ0 for 100,000 randomly chosen unitary operators
Q in Eq. (33): When the operator is one of the Pauli matrices (the distance is 2), the
minimal probability to detect a forgery attack, Pmin, has a local minimum.
the points (dQ, PQ) in Figure 1, from which we can furthermore see that d = 0 if and
only if Pmin(d) = 0, that is, a forgery attack operator is not the identity operator up
to global phase if and only if its detection probability is strictly positive. This directly
implies that there does not exist any forgeable messages in this AQS scheme.
In addition, we can see from Figure 1 that, for a forgery attack operator with
distance less than 3/2, the minimal probability to detect the attack is small if and
only if the operator is close to the identity operator. Therefore, we can obtain that the
maximal probability not to detect a forgery attack, (1− Pmin(d))n, is exponentially close
10
to zero by performing sufficiently large number n of swap tests for n + 1 copies of the
message-signature pairs, and hence one can detect any forgery attack with arbitrarily
small error probability in the AQS scheme with {R˜j}j∈Z4 and {σkT}k∈Z4 as a random
rotation and a quantum encryption, respectively.
4. Conclusion
We have considered forgeable quantum messages in AQS schemes, and have shown
that there exists at least one forgeable quantum message-signature pair for almost all
known AQS schemes. Finally, we have numerically shown that there does not exist any
forgeable quantum messages in the AQS scheme with sequential quantum encryptions
{R˜j}j∈Z4 and {σkT}k∈Z4 . Moreover, it can be shown that the arbitrator can confirm
the fact that a sender signed the message since the information of the sender’s secret
key is involved in the signature, and hence it is impossible for a sender to disavow the
signature [3, 4, 6].
However, since this scheme uses more random rotation operators than the previous
ones, it needs users’ more key strings shared in advance, and plenty of copies of the
message-signature pairs should be required, in order to detect a forgery attack operator
quite close to the identity operator. This means that the AQS scheme demands quite a
few both classical and quantum resources. In addition, the AQS scheme may have other
security problems such as the information leakage from many copies of the messages,
which has not been analysed in this paper. Hence, we cannot say that the AQS scheme
is practically useful.
Nevertheless, we can still say that it is helpful to study AQS schemes without
forgeable quantum messages in improving theoretical works related to AQS, since
the forgeability may invoke another problem which we have not dealt with in AQS.
Therefore, our result could be a basic reference for both theoretical and practical
applications of AQS, such as finding a practically useful AQS scheme without forgeable
messages, and would also be helpful to strengthen theories in quantum cryptography.
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